ISSN 0253-2778

CN 34-1054/N

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Open AccessOpen Access JUSTC Original Paper

Characteristics of companies with financial fraud based on time-dependent COX model

  • School of Management, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China

Cite this:
https://doi.org/10.3969/j.issn.0253-2778.2017.03.008
  • Received Date: 05 May 2016
  • Accepted Date: 10 June 2016
  • Rev Recd Date: 10 June 2016
  • Publish Date: 30 March 2017
    Abstract

  • Abstract

    Financial fraud of the listed companies taken place in China A share market from 2008 to 2015 was investigated. By using the time-dependent COX model, the characteristics of the financial fraud companies were analyzed from financial ratios, ownership structure, corporate governance and other aspects and the relative hazard rate of each factor was given. The results show that the greater the size of the company, getting a standard unqualified audit opinion, the greater its quick ratio, the higher the shareholding proportion of the controlling shareholder，and the higher the shareholding proportion of the board of supervisors, the smaller the likelihood that financial fraud will occur, while great frequency of board meetings will more likely result in financial fraud.

    Abstract

    Financial fraud of the listed companies taken place in China A share market from 2008 to 2015 was investigated. By using the time-dependent COX model, the characteristics of the financial fraud companies were analyzed from financial ratios, ownership structure, corporate governance and other aspects and the relative hazard rate of each factor was given. The results show that the greater the size of the company, getting a standard unqualified audit opinion, the greater its quick ratio, the higher the shareholding proportion of the controlling shareholder，and the higher the shareholding proportion of the board of supervisors, the smaller the likelihood that financial fraud will occur, while great frequency of board meetings will more likely result in financial fraud.
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    • References(24)
  • [1]
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    [2]
    ALBRECHT W S, WRENS G W, WILLIAMS T L. Fraud: Bring the Light to the Dark Side of Business[M]. New York: New York Irwin Inc, 1995: 15-52.
    [3]
    BOLOGNA G J, LINDQUIST R J, WELLS J T. The Accountant’s Handbook of Fraud and Commercial Crime[M]. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1993: 20-31.
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    何红.上市公司舞弊性财务报告产生的因素分析[D]. 上海：复旦大学,2002.
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    娄权.财务报告舞弊四因子假说及其实证检验[D]. 厦门：厦门大学,2004.
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    BEASLEY M S. An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud[J]. Accounting Review, 1996, 71(4): 443-465.
    [7]
    BENEISH M D. Incentives and penalties related to earnings overstatements that violate GAAP[J]. Accounting Review, 1999, 74(4):425-457.
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    RAVISANKAR P, RAVI V, RAO G R, et al. Detection of financial statement fraud and feature selection using data mining techniques[J]. Decision Support Systems, 2011, 50(2): 491-500.
    [9]
    YU F, YU X. Corporate lobbying and fraud detection[J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2012, 46(6): 1865-1891.
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    蔡宁，梁丽珍.公司治理与财务舞弊关系的经验分析[J].财经理论与实践，2003, 24(6)：80-84.
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    陈国欣，吕占甲，何峰.财务报告舞弊识别的实证研究[J].审计研究，2007(3): 88-93.
    [12]
    刘文军，米莉，傅倞轩.审计师行业专长与审计质量[J].审计研究，2010(1): 47-56.
    [13]
    李兴灵.上市公司财务舞弊治理对策[J].财会研究，2010(15): 53-55.
    [14]

    薄澜，姚海鑫.上市公司财务舞弊与外部审计的博弈分析[J].审计与经济研究，2013(3): 43-51.
    [15]
    JENSEN M C, MECKLING W H. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1976, 3(4):305-360.
    [16]
    张翼，马光.法律、公司治理与公司丑闻[J].管理世界, 2005(10): 113-122.
    [17]
    LIPTON M, LORSCH J W. A modest proposal for improved corporate governance[J].The Business Lawyer, 1992, 48(1):59-77.
    [18]
    CARCELLO J V, HERMANSON D R, NEAL T L, et al. Board characteristics and audit fees[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research, 2002, 19(3): 365-384.
    [19]
    谷祺，于东智. 公司治理、董事会行为与经营绩效[J].财经问题研究，2001(1): 58-65.
    [20]
    陈关亭.上市公司财务敏感区间与项目的审计意见[J].会计研究, 2005(7): 32-38.
    [21]
    KINNEY W R, MCDANIEL L S. Characteristics of firms correcting previously reported quarterly earnings[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1989, 11(1): 71-93.
    [22]
    DECHOW P M, SLOAN R G, SWEENEY A P. Causes and consequences of earnings manipulation: An analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research, 1996, 13(1): 1-36.
    [23]
    袁春生.上市公司财务舞弊监督失效假说及其实证检验[D].武汉：华中科技大学,2008.
    [24]
    FAN J P H, WONG T J. Do external auditors perform a corporate governance role in emerging markets? Evidence from East Asia[J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 2005, 43(1): 35-72.)
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    [1]
    BOLOGNA G J, LINDQUIST R J. Fraud Auditing and Forensic Accounting: New Tools and Techniques[M]. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1995: 30-43.
    [2]
    ALBRECHT W S, WRENS G W, WILLIAMS T L. Fraud: Bring the Light to the Dark Side of Business[M]. New York: New York Irwin Inc, 1995: 15-52.
    [3]
    BOLOGNA G J, LINDQUIST R J, WELLS J T. The Accountant’s Handbook of Fraud and Commercial Crime[M]. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1993: 20-31.
    [4]
    何红.上市公司舞弊性财务报告产生的因素分析[D]. 上海：复旦大学,2002.
    [5]
    娄权.财务报告舞弊四因子假说及其实证检验[D]. 厦门：厦门大学,2004.
    [6]
    BEASLEY M S. An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud[J]. Accounting Review, 1996, 71(4): 443-465.
    [7]
    BENEISH M D. Incentives and penalties related to earnings overstatements that violate GAAP[J]. Accounting Review, 1999, 74(4):425-457.
    [8]
    RAVISANKAR P, RAVI V, RAO G R, et al. Detection of financial statement fraud and feature selection using data mining techniques[J]. Decision Support Systems, 2011, 50(2): 491-500.
    [9]
    YU F, YU X. Corporate lobbying and fraud detection[J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2012, 46(6): 1865-1891.
    [10]
    蔡宁，梁丽珍.公司治理与财务舞弊关系的经验分析[J].财经理论与实践，2003, 24(6)：80-84.
    [11]
    陈国欣，吕占甲，何峰.财务报告舞弊识别的实证研究[J].审计研究，2007(3): 88-93.
    [12]
    刘文军，米莉，傅倞轩.审计师行业专长与审计质量[J].审计研究，2010(1): 47-56.
    [13]
    李兴灵.上市公司财务舞弊治理对策[J].财会研究，2010(15): 53-55.
    [14]

    薄澜，姚海鑫.上市公司财务舞弊与外部审计的博弈分析[J].审计与经济研究，2013(3): 43-51.
    [15]
    JENSEN M C, MECKLING W H. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1976, 3(4):305-360.
    [16]
    张翼，马光.法律、公司治理与公司丑闻[J].管理世界, 2005(10): 113-122.
    [17]
    LIPTON M, LORSCH J W. A modest proposal for improved corporate governance[J].The Business Lawyer, 1992, 48(1):59-77.
    [18]
    CARCELLO J V, HERMANSON D R, NEAL T L, et al. Board characteristics and audit fees[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research, 2002, 19(3): 365-384.
    [19]
    谷祺，于东智. 公司治理、董事会行为与经营绩效[J].财经问题研究，2001(1): 58-65.
    [20]
    陈关亭.上市公司财务敏感区间与项目的审计意见[J].会计研究, 2005(7): 32-38.
    [21]
    KINNEY W R, MCDANIEL L S. Characteristics of firms correcting previously reported quarterly earnings[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1989, 11(1): 71-93.
    [22]
    DECHOW P M, SLOAN R G, SWEENEY A P. Causes and consequences of earnings manipulation: An analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research, 1996, 13(1): 1-36.
    [23]
    袁春生.上市公司财务舞弊监督失效假说及其实证检验[D].武汉：华中科技大学,2008.
    [24]
    FAN J P H, WONG T J. Do external auditors perform a corporate governance role in emerging markets? Evidence from East Asia[J]. Journal of Accounting Research, 2005, 43(1): 35-72.)
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