Strategic adoption of consumer credit in coopetitive dual-channel supply chains

Consumer credit, particularly interest-free installment services, has become an important tool for promoting online sales. However, its role in dual-channel supply chains, where suppliers operate both direct and resale channels, remains underexplored. This paper develops a game-theoretic model to investigate strategic decisions about adopting interest-free consumer credit under supplier-retailer coopetition. The model incorporates heterogeneous consumer disposable personal income, consumer credit utility, and credit service fee rate, and analyzes how adoption strategies affect pricing, demand allocation, and profit distribution. The results show that optimal adoption strategies depend on the credit service fee rate and consumer credit utility. When credit utility is low and the service fee rate is high, mutual non-adoption is the stable outcome. When credit utility is moderate, unilateral adoption may emerge, depending on channel power and cost-sharing capacity. When credit utility is high and the service fee rate is low, bilateral adoption can attain equilibrium. Sequential pricing strengthens the leader’s ability to shift costs, but may weaken channel coordination when credit utility is insufficient. The analysis also offers managerial implications. Suppliers should carefully adjust wholesale and direct-channel prices when adopting credit, because their profitability depends on whether retailers also adopt. Retailers can leverage unilateral adoption, flexible installment designs, and service advantages to attract credit-sensitive consumers. Platforms should design fee structures that remain sustainable under both unilateral and bilateral adoption. This study links credit adoption decisions to channel power in dual-channel supply chains and identifies the parameter conditions under which adoption produces win-win or conflict outcomes, providing a theoretical basis and practical guidance for credit adoption strategies.