ISSN 0253-2778

CN 34-1054/N

Open AccessOpen Access JUSTC

Optimal copyright protection and pricing decision of digital content products in monopoly enterprise

Cite this:
https://doi.org/10.3969/j.issn.0253-2778.2019.09.007
  • Received Date: 14 March 2019
  • Rev Recd Date: 22 April 2019
  • Publish Date: 30 September 2019
  • With the development of technology and the increasing market demand for digital products, there are more and more pirated products. The optimal decision (intensity of copyright protection and product pricing) of a monopoly enterprise for the copyright of digital content products was studied under different market conditions and the existence of copyright protection cost. A cost function of copyright protection was given, which specifically depicts the relationship between copyright protection cost, copyright protection intensity and product price.According to the situation of consumers, the market was divided into two types: non-piracy market and piracy market. The results show that the copyright protection intensity is not as high as possible. In addition, when consumer piracy aversion is low, the profit of the piracy market is almost the same as that of the non-piracy market; when consumer piracy aversion is high, it is more beneficial not to take copyright protection measures for the monopoly enterprise.
    With the development of technology and the increasing market demand for digital products, there are more and more pirated products. The optimal decision (intensity of copyright protection and product pricing) of a monopoly enterprise for the copyright of digital content products was studied under different market conditions and the existence of copyright protection cost. A cost function of copyright protection was given, which specifically depicts the relationship between copyright protection cost, copyright protection intensity and product price.According to the situation of consumers, the market was divided into two types: non-piracy market and piracy market. The results show that the copyright protection intensity is not as high as possible. In addition, when consumer piracy aversion is low, the profit of the piracy market is almost the same as that of the non-piracy market; when consumer piracy aversion is high, it is more beneficial not to take copyright protection measures for the monopoly enterprise.
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