Abstract
A game equilibrium was studied in which a secondary dairy supply chain system consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer experiences a random disturbance of the market demand information caused by emergencies, and dairy product retailers can accurately grasp the information due to their close touch with the market and decide whether to share it with the dairy manufacturer. The results show that demand information sharing can increase the benefits of the entire dairy supply chain under certain conditions. Based on the principle of the overall profit maximization of the dairy supply chain and the Pareto condition of dairy manufacturer and retailer, the incentive model of demand information sharing during emergencies was constructed. Simulation results show that the incentive model can maximize the overall benefits of the dairy supply chain.
Abstract
A game equilibrium was studied in which a secondary dairy supply chain system consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer experiences a random disturbance of the market demand information caused by emergencies, and dairy product retailers can accurately grasp the information due to their close touch with the market and decide whether to share it with the dairy manufacturer. The results show that demand information sharing can increase the benefits of the entire dairy supply chain under certain conditions. Based on the principle of the overall profit maximization of the dairy supply chain and the Pareto condition of dairy manufacturer and retailer, the incentive model of demand information sharing during emergencies was constructed. Simulation results show that the incentive model can maximize the overall benefits of the dairy supply chain.
Open Access
JUSTC
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