双渠道下考虑消费者偏好的酒店与OTA合作模式选择和定价
Cooperation mode selection and pricing between hotel and OTA considering consumer preference under dual-channel supply chain
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摘要: 在旅游供应链的背景下，基于酒店和在线旅游代理商（online travel agency, OTA）之间在双渠道营销策略中不同的合作模式：佣金模式和批发模式，研究酒店和OTA之间的合作模式选择和定价问题.酒店和OTA之间存在Stackelberg博弈，酒店作为旅游供应商占据博弈主导地位，OTA作为跟随者需要付出销售努力.利用博弈模型求出两种模式下的均衡解，分析消费者偏好对酒店的最优定价、OTA最优销售努力的影响，并对影响酒店对不同合作模式的选择的因素：直销渠道消费者偏好、交叉价格弹性系数和OTA销售努力的交叉敏感系数，进行了灵敏度分析.研究表明，在佣金模式下,OTA 的销售努力随着房间价格和佣金的增加而增加;在批发模式下,OTA 的销售努力随着直销渠道房间价格增加而增加，随着批发价增加而减少.对于合作模式的选择，当OTA销售努力对直销需求的交叉敏感系数或者消费者对直销渠道的偏好较小时，酒店应当选择佣金模式获得更高的利润,否则，应当选择批发模式与OTA进行合作.Abstract: In the context of the tourism supply chain, based on the different cooperation mode in the dual channel marketing strategy between the hotel and the online travel agency (OTA): commission mode and merchant mode, the choice of cooperation mode and pricing between hotel and OTA was studied. There is a Stackelberg game between the hotel and the OTA. The hotel as a tourism provider occupies a dominant position in the game, OTA as a follower is required to decide sales effort.
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